


NRO Review Completed.

NSA review completed

DCI/IC 74-030
4 March 1974



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: DCI Overview of National SIGINT Programs


Bill:

I have not tinkered with the staff work on this proposal. It is a well thought-out paper. I do have some general comments as follows:

-- "EXCOM" is probably a scare word to some. DIA, for instance, would worry about being cut out of the final decision area. This can be fixed easily enough by giving the body a different name-- or no name.

-- The National SIGINT Plan should be reviewed by USIB and IRAC (essentially by the SIGINT Cmte), and only unresolved issues brought before the "EXCOM."

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(Signed)
DANIEL O. GRAHAM, LTG, USA

Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

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Copy ~~2~~ of ~~8~~ #4 *Sec B*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : DCI Overview of National SIGINT Programs

1. You asked that a paper be prepared which you could use in talking with Lew Allen re the programming arrangements for the CIA SIGINT equipment. This memorandum addresses this specific problem in paragraphs 9 through 12 and in Tabs D and E.

2. It is our view, however, and also General Allen's, that this issue should be addressed in the broader context of overall NSA/CIA relationships and of your responsibility to respond to the Presidential Directive of November 1971. Paragraphs 3 through 8 and Tabs A, B, and C address this broader context.

3. Under present circumstances, the DCI's ability to carry out his responsibilities with respect to SIGINT activities in the National Intelligence Program (NIP) varies widely from one component program to another. You have direct authority over CIA's SIGINT activities and effective influence in the direction of the SIGINT aspects

With respect to the CCP and the SIGINT elements of the GDIP, however, you have had to rely primarily on the marginally effective expedient of IC Staff participation with the ASD(I). The IRAC has not chosen to review and assess the allocation of resources among different SIGINT programs or between SIGINT programs (and particularly the CCP) and other major elements of the NIP.

4. The fundamental problem, of course, is that there is at present no national SIGINT program plan and no effective means of bridging the gap between SecDef and DCI requirements in order to produce one. The nearest approach to such a plan is in the budgetary submissions of the CCP. While the procedures for developing these submissions have been fairly open to the DCI and all parties and agencies participate, the operational concepts reflected in the CCP budgetary allocations over the past years have been developed largely among the Services and NSA

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on an incremental basis. DCI involvement has been largely when the CIA programs were in question and through IC involvement in NSA program development. (Tab A provides a recent schedule of events for IC participation.)

5. We believe that in order for you to respond more effectively to the Presidential Directives of November 1971 and at the same time to provide for coordinated SecDef/DCI direction to DIRNSA, a new mechanism is needed. We suggest that perhaps the most practicable way of doing this would be to establish a SIGINT EXCOM to oversee all SIGINT activities in an arrangement patterned after the NRP. This would give you an opportunity to endorse both the policy orientation of SIGINT programs and the funding mix as it relates to the overall National Foreign Intelligence Program. It would place you in a better position to make informed recommendations to the President on SIGINT resources and policy. It would also provide a more solid basis and forum for the determination of CIA's and other agencies' proper role in the SIGINT area and the resolution of such specific problems as [redacted] equipment and funding. Finally, and most importantly, it would consolidate and unify SecDef/DCI guidance and direction to the Director of NSA and clarify his authority and responsibility to produce and budget the National SIGINT Plan and to manage the approved National SIGINT Program. Tab B is a first draft of a SecDef/DCI agreement to establish a National SIGINT Program and a SIGINT EXCOM. Its structure and much of the wording are drawn from the 1965 "Agreement for Reorganization of the NRP" signed by Cyrus Vance and Admiral Rayborn. Many of its provisions are debatable and provocative (e.g., including tactical and departmental SIGINT, as well as national and strategic), but it might serve as a useful jumping-off point for a comprehensive study of the concept by a DOD/NSA/CIA task force.

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6. We believe General Allen would welcome a more substantive DCI role in guidance of SIGINT programs. In September 1973, for example, a draft NSA report entitled "U.S. SIGINT Operations Strategy" contained the following sentences: "The SIGINT system, being under SecDef as Executive Agent, is overly sensitive to military priorities. The DCI should redress the balance through the development of an evaluation and resource management process external to NSA/CSS." The KIQA evaluation procedures currently being developed will begin in a small way to contribute to this end. But it cannot provide the kind of DCI management focus, implicit in an EXCOM-type arrangement, which I believe the situation calls for.

7. We suggest you discuss the concept of a SIGINT EXCOM with General Allen and, assuming his concurrence, subsequently with

Dr. Hall and Dr. Schlesinger. Talking points for that purpose are attached at Tab C.

8. CIA has recently proposed splitting the SIGINT Committee of USIB into three separate committees for COMINT, ELINT, and Telemetry and others. We suggest no action be taken on this proposal until a decision has been reached on the SIGINT EXCOM concept.

9. The issue with respect to [] equipment funding is, as always, one of divided authorities. At present the arrangement calls for CIA and NSA jointly to work out certain, but not all, [] equipment planning and include dollar amounts in the NSA CCP budget submission through the Secretary of Defense to the President. When these funds are finally authorized by Congress, NSA executes the plan by making the equipment or funds available to CIA []. At that point, some reprogramming can occur between the two agencies. In the case of equipment, NSA controls the funds. (Some equipment funds are still controlled by CIA and still others by the Military Services.)

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SIGNED

Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

Attachments:

- Tab A - Recent schedule of events for
IC Participation
- Tab B - Draft Agreement
- Tab C - Talking Points on SIGINT
EXCOM
- Tab D - CIA Proposed Course
- Tab E - NSA Proposed Course

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Distribution Page for

JHLeavitt:bb

Distribution: (All with Tabs)

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